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Abstract: This paper proposes a novel answer to the question of what attitude agents should adopt 
when they receive misleading higher-order evidence that avoids the drawbacks of existing views. 
The answer builds on the independently motivated observation that there is a difference between 
attitudes that agents form as conclusions of their reasoning, called terminal attitudes, and attitudes 
that are formed in a transitional manner in the process of reasoning, called transitional attitudes. 
Terminal and transitional attitudes differ both in their descriptive and in their normative 
properties. When an agent receives higher-order evidence that they might have reasoned 
incorrectly to a belief or credence towards p, then their attitude towards p is no longer justified as 
a terminal attitude towards p, but it can still be justified as a transitional attitude. This view, which I 
call the unmooring view, allows us to capture the rational impact of misleading higher-order evidence 




Claire and Mallory go to lunch together, and agree to split the bill in half, with a 20% tip. They 
both calculate their share, with Claire concluding that they each owe $25 and Mallory concluding 
that they each owe $27. They realize that at least one of them must have made an error, but they 
don’t know who. As it happens, Claire is correct. Hence, Claire has performed correct first-order 
reasoning to arrive at her answer, but she has credible, yet misleading higher-order evidence that 
her calculation might be faulty. How should she react? More generally, what is the rational 
response when one receives misleading higher-order evidence? 
Answers to this question can be roughly divided into three categories: Proponents of a 
steadfast view say that Claire should stick to her answer, because she has reasoned correctly. 
Conciliationists recommend that Claire should reduce her confidence in her answer, because her 
higher-order evidence indicates that she likely made a mistake. Level-splitters think that Claire 
should stick to her belief, but also believe that her belief is not justified since there is a good chance 
that she made an error. Unfortunately, each of these responses has unsatisfying implications, since 
they say that agents must either be epistemically akratic or discount part of their evidence.  
 In this paper I propose a novel answer to the question of what attitude agents should adopt 
when they receive misleading higher-order evidence. This new view avoids the drawbacks of 
existing views while preserving their main insights. It builds on the independently motivated 
observation that there is a difference between attitudes that agents form as conclusions of their 
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reasoning, called terminal attitudes, and attitudes that are formed in a preliminary manner in the 
process of reasoning, called transitional attitudes. Terminal and transitional attitudes differ both in 
their descriptive and in their normative properties (Staffel, 2019b). I argue that when an agent 
receives higher-order evidence that they might have reasoned incorrectly to a belief or credence 
towards p, then their attitude towards p is no longer justified as a terminal attitude, but it can still be 
justified as a transitional attitude. This view, which I call the unmooring view, allows us to capture the 
rational impact of misleading higher-order evidence in a way that integrates smoothly with a 
natural picture of epistemic justification and the dynamics of deliberation.  
 My discussion will proceed as follows: In section 1, I explain the three leading responses to 
the problem of misleading higher-order evidence in more detail. In section 2, I take a closer look 
at the deliberation dynamics of higher-order evidence cases and show how this can help us develop 
the unmooring view. Section 3 introduces the distinction between transitional and terminal 
attitudes that serves as the basis for this new view. In section 4, I explain my account of rationally 
responding to misleading higher-order evidence in detail. I discuss possible alternative views in 
section 5.  
 
1. Three Ways of Responding to Misleading Higher Order Evidence 
The lunch bill example I just introduced provides a good illustration of the structure of misleading 
higher-order evidence cases. An agent forms a belief or credence about some claim p based on a 
correct deliberation about their first-order evidence, where their first-order evidence is understood 
to be the evidence they have that directly bears on whether p is true. The agent then receives 
evidence from a credible source suggesting that their reasoning is mistaken or unreliable. This 
higher-order evidence is misleading, since the agent actually reasoned correctly. The question to 
be answered is: What is the rational attitude to adopt in response to receiving this evidence?1 
Besides the classic lunch bill case (Christensen, 2007), another well-known case is Horowitz’s case 
of the sleepy detective (Horowitz, 2014): Police detective Sam correctly determines which suspect 
stole the jewels, and forms a rational high confidence that Lucy is the thief. When he tells his 
colleague, she points out that he is very sleep deprived, which has frequently led him to make 
reasoning errors in the past. Sam realizes that she is right – his past track record calls into question 
whether he should trust his reasoning about Lucy being the thief. 
 How should agents respond to receiving misleading higher-order evidence? The 
conciliationist position (also called “downward push”, Smithies, 2019) suggests that they should 
reduce their confidence in their conclusion. Different versions of conciliationism disagree about 
how much they should reduce their confidence, but they agree that the higher-order evidence 
exerts rational pressure that invalidates their first-order justification. Accordingly, our agents would 
not be justified in retaining their original credences in their conclusions. The conciliationist position 
 
1 Why focus on this particular type of case? It turns out that other instances in which agents receive higher-order 
evidence are much less puzzling. For example, suppose an agent has reasoned poorly, without noticing their mistake. 
Standard theories of epistemic justification tend to agree that the agent’s conclusion is unjustified. This is unaffected 
by receiving higher-order evidence that either tells the agent that they reasoned well or that they reasoned poorly. 
Hence, these kinds of cases don’t present much of a puzzle. See for example Pryor (2018) for discussion.  
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is attractive, because it captures the compelling intuition that it would be irrationally stubborn to 
stick to one’s guns upon receiving credible evidence that one might have made a mistake. 
Unfortunately, the conciliationist position has some significant drawbacks. It clashes with 
evidentialism, specifically, with versions of evidentialism on which evidential support is primarily 
determined by an agent’s first-order evidence that bears on the truth of the claim under 
consideration. All along, Claire’s first-order evidence supports that the lunch bill is $25 per person 
and Sam’s first-order evidence supports that Lucy stole the jewels. The fact that they might have 
reasoned poorly doesn’t seem to change this. Yet, according to the conciliationist, they must adopt 
an attitude that is not supported by their first-order evidence when they receive the misleading 
higher-order evidence. A further problem that has been raised for conciliationism is that it leads to 
undue skepticism, since we can almost always find moderately reasonable people who disagree 
with us on important matters. Lastly, some have argued that conciliationism is self-undermining, 
because conciliationists seem to be required to abandon confidence in their view when they 
encounter non-conciliationists.2 Proponents of conciliationism have offered reasons for why these 
problems are not decisive, but they remain costs of the view.  
 Those who consider these problems for conciliationism damning have often adopted a 
steadfast position instead (also called “upward push”, Smithies, 2019). This position emphasizes 
that the agents in our scenarios have in fact evaluated their first-order evidence correctly and have 
arrived at the attitude supported by their information. Claire and Sam are thus justified in sticking 
to their initial conclusions and discounting the misleading higher-order evidence. The steadfast 
view is attractive because it coheres well with (first-order) evidentialism, it’s not self-undermining, 
and it doesn’t lead to rampant skepticism. However, it has the obvious drawback that it condones 
discounting higher-order evidence. This might be fine when the higher-order evidence is in fact 
misleading, but by stipulation, our agents don’t know whether they have reasoned well or made an 
error. Entirely discounting this information doesn’t seem rational. The steadfast view is thus ill-
positioned to deliver any guidance to agents. The view seems to encourage them to stubbornly 
assume they are correct even in cases in which there is good reason to suspect they might not be. 
Proponents of the steadfast view offer ways to soften the blow of these implications, but this does 
not alter the fundamental issue that higher-order evidence has little to no impact on this view.3  
 In an attempt to do justice to both the agent’s first- and higher-order evidence, some 
philosophers have suggested level-splitting views. Level-splitters propose that agents who have 
misleading higher-order evidence should stick to their original conclusions, but that these agents 
should also believe of themselves that they are unjustified in holding these attitudes. For example, 
on this view, Sam should be confident that Lucy stole the jewels, and he should also think that his 
confidence is unjustified. Claire should think that the lunch bill is $25 per person, and also that she 
 
2 The literature on disagreement and higher-order evidence is vast, so here and below I can only offer a sampling of 
references to relevant work. Readers may wish to consult the excellent edited volumes by Feldman and Warfield (2010), 
Christensen and Lackey (2013), and Skipper and Steglich-Petersen (2019) as a starting place. Proponents of versions 
of conciliationism include Christensen (2007), Elga 2007, Bogardus (2009), and Feldman (2009). For discussions of the 
criticisms I mention, see, e.g., Elga (2010), Carey and Matheson (2013), Fleisher (2021), and references therein. 
3 Variations on steadfast views are proposed by e.g. Van Inwagen (1996), Kelly (2005), Smithies (2012) and Titelbaum 
(2015). 
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is not justified in holding this belief. Level-splitting is motivated by an attempt to incorporate all of 
the agent’s evidence. The idea is that by holding on to their original conclusion, the agent respects 
their first-order evidence, and by also thinking that their attitude is unjustified, they respect their 
higher-order evidence. The problem is that level-splitting endorses epistemic akrasia, i.e., it permits 
agents to hold attitudes that they themselves think are unjustified. There is an obvious rational 
tension in both believing p and believing that my belief in p is unjustified. Interestingly, in some 
special cases, akrasia might be rational – those are cases in which agents are uncertain about what 
their evidence is, or where one’s evidence predictably leads one to falsity rather than truth.4 
However, in ordinary cases of misleading higher-order evidence like the ones considered here, it is 
difficult to see how holding epistemically akratic attitudes could be rational. 
 Much more can be said about how to best formulate and defend each of these views. But 
my aim here is not to refute existing views, but rather to present an alternative theory that has all 
of their advantages and none of their drawbacks. More specifically, the unmooring view will be 
able to capture the steadfaster’s idea that what an agent is justified to believe depends on their first-
order evidence, it will preserve the conciliationist insight that we should sometimes lower our 
confidence when receiving higher-order evidence, and it will avoid condoning epistemic akrasia. 
None of the existing views can capture all three of these claims. In the next section, I will take a 
closer look at how the three views just discussed interact with theories of epistemic justification, 
which will help motivate the unmooring view.  
 
2. Two Types of Justification and the Dynamics of Deliberation  
In formulating theories of epistemic justification, epistemologists have been following Firth’s lead 
in distinguishing between propositional and doxastic justification (Firth, 1978). The basic idea 
behind these two notions is that we can distinguish between what an agent is justified to believe, and 
what they are justified in believing. On evidentialist versions of the distinction, what an agent is 
justified to believe is thought to depend on what evidence they have. An agent who is justified to 
believe some claim p, or to assign some specific level of credence to p need not actually have this 
attitude; they might have never even considered p. By contrast, to be justified in believing/having a 
particular credence in p, the agent must actually have the attitude, and they must hold it in a way that 
is properly based on their evidence. In rough terms, then, we can say that doxastic justification 
(holding a justified doxastic attitude) requires propositional justification (having justification for that 
attitude) plus proper basing. Reliabilists, by contrast, see doxastic justification as the primary 
notion, and propositional justification as the derived notion. Standard reliabilist accounts consider 
a belief to be prima facie doxastically justified just in case it is arrived at via a reliable process, or, 
in cases of inferential belief-formation, via a process that is reliable conditional on receiving reliable 
inputs. A belief is propositionally justified for an agent on this view when there is a reliable process 
available to the agent by which they could come to have the belief (Goldman, 1979). To give a 
reliabilist account of justified credence instead of justified belief, one can simply replace the target 
 
4 Proponents of level-splitting views include Williamson (2011), Coates (2012), Hazlett (2012), and Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2020). For discussion of the (ir)rationality of level-splitting, see e.g. Horowitz (2014), Sliwa and Horowitz (2015).  
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state that a reliable process must produce. If a reliable process (or ability, on more virtue-oriented 
accounts) is a process that reliably produces some valuable target state, then this target state need 
not be a true belief, it can also be a credence. For example, one may identify the target state as the 
objective probability that is warranted by the agent’s grounds (Dunn, 2015, Tang, 2016, Pettigrew, 
2021), or as an evidential probability (Comesaña, 2018). 
 In an insightful article, Han Van Wietmarschen (2013) has observed that each of these 
notions of justification naturally aligns with a view on how to respond to higher-order evidence. 
The steadfast view seems most plausible when it is interpreted as being about propositional 
justification (even if this wasn’t its originally intended reading). This is because the steadfast view 
emphasizes that what the first-order evidence supports remains constant, regardless of what higher-
order evidence the agent receives. Similarly for reliabilist propositional justification – it remains 
true that the agents have a reliable process available to them to figure out the answer, regardless 
of the higher-order evidence they receive. For example, in the lunch bill case, no amount of higher-
order evidence can change the mathematical fact that half the bill with a 20% tip comes to $25. 
Moreover, it is clear from the example that Claire can do the math. Similarly, Sam’s first-order 
evidence will always implicate Lucy as being the jewel thief. He is able to figure this out by 
reasoning correctly about the evidence.5 Interpreted in this way, however, the steadfast view no 
longer tells agents what to do when they receive credible higher-order evidence that they might 
have made a mistake. The view simply affirms that their propositional justification remains 
unaffected. The question of what attitude the agent should adopt upon receiving the misleading 
higher-order evidence remains unanswered.  
The conciliatory view, on the other hand, is better interpreted as concerning doxastic 
justification, according to Van Wietmarschen. Doxastic justification requires that one’s attitudes 
must be properly based on one’s evidence, or arrived at via a reliable process. Learning that there 
is a good chance that one’s reasoning is flawed plausibly undermines the justificatory connection 
between one’s attitude and the basis of one’s attitude, rendering the attitude doxastically 
unjustified.6  Yet, it has been pointed out that that the association between the doxastic notion of 
justification and the conciliatory view is not as straightforward as one might have thought at first 
glance.7 While it seems compelling that higher-order evidence can defeat one’s doxastic 
justification for one’s initial conclusion, we have no clear story about what attitude could be 
doxastically justified for the agent instead. The conciliationist claims that Claire and Sam should 
reduce their confidence in their favored answers when they receive the misleading higher-order 
 
5 Notice that a reliabilist might say that Sam’s case isn’t an interesting case of misleading higher-order evidence, 
because it’s not a case in which he is doxastically justified before receiving the higher-order evidence. This is because 
he relies on sleep-deprived reasoning. On this way of looking at the cases, the reliabilist should disregard the Sam 
example and focus on cases like Claire’s. 
6 Most recent versions of reliabilism focus on full belief, regardless of whether they are of the process or virtue variety 
(see for example Lyons, 2016, Kelp, 2019, Beddor, forthcoming). There has been some debate recently about how to 
best incorporate a treatment of defeat into a reliabilist theory, but the details of this discussion don’t affect the 
arguments I make here (Beddor, 2015, Beddor, forthcoming). There are also hybrid accounts of justification that 
combine elements from both reliabilism and evidentialism, but they don’t yield different answers to the questions posed 
here than the views I’ve already discussed (see e.g. Comesaña, 2010, 2018). 
7 Van Wietmarschen himself notices this (p. 418), and Titelbaum points it out in “Return to Reason” (section 5). 
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evidence. But this reduced confidence can’t be doxastically justified according to commonly 
endorsed views of doxastic justification, on which doxastic justification entails propositional 
justification. If propositional justification depends on one’s first-order evidence or grounds, which 
is a popular position, only Claire’s and Sam’s original attitudes can be propositionally justified. 
And even if we allow propositional justification to depend on both first- and higher-order evidence, 
it’s not clear whether this supports a reduced confidence for Claire and Sam. Claire still has 
entailing evidence for the $25 answer, even if we add to that the proposition that Mallory got a 
different answer. And Sam still has strong evidence that points to Lucy as being the thief, even if 
we add to that the claim that he reasoned when he was tired. Hence, it’s hard to see how the 
reduced confidence recommended by the conciliationist can be propositionally justified, which 
means that it can’t be doxastically justified either.8 This leaves us in an uncomfortable position: it 
seems like whatever attitude agents adopt upon receiving misleading higher-order evidence, their 
attitude won’t be doxastically justified. This is precisely the conclusion reached by Silva (2017): He 
argues that our agents find themselves in a dilemma, in the sense that there is no attitude they can 
adopt that is doxastically justified. Van Wietmarschen (2013), Palmira (2019) and Titelbaum (2019) 
also notice this apparent dead end.  
 The view I propose offers a way out of this quandary that neither ignores the higher-order 
evidence, nor leaves the agent without any justified attitudes to adopt. The unmooring view embraces 
the suggestion that misleading higher-order evidence defeats doxastic justification, but it also 
explains which attitudes agents can justifiably adopt upon receiving such evidence. To motivate 
the view, let’s go back to our examples and think about what should happen after Claire and Sam 
receive the higher-order evidence. Before learning about her disagreement with Mallory, Claire 
considers the question of how much they each owe for lunch to be settled, and so does Mallory. 
They both think they have properly calculated their share. But once they realize they disagree, it 
seems no longer reasonable for them to consider this question settled. Suppose they subsequently 
drop their confidence in their respective conclusions and assign some confidence to the other 
person’s answer. Clearly, this reduced confidence only be a transitional or intermediary stage in 
their deliberation. They both know that their evidence warrants full confidence in some answer, 
but they don’t know which one. Hence, both Claire and Mallory will redo their calculations, 
perhaps this time in a slightly different way, to catch the mistake. They will only consider a potential 
answer to the question of how much they owe to be a justified conclusion of their reasoning if they 
arrive at the same answer via a calculation that appears flawless. 
 We can observe a similar deliberative dynamic in Sam, assuming he is reasonable. He 
initially considers the question of who stole the jewels to be settled, but then realizes that he 
shouldn’t trust his sleep-deprived deliberations. As a result, he no longer considers the question of 
 
8 Even David Christensen (2010), a conciliationist, admits that it is hard to see how misleading higher-order evidence 
could affect propositional justification: “[I]n the case where I’m immune [to the effects of a reason-distorting drug], it 
is not obvious why my total evidence, after I learn about the drug, does not support my original conclusion just as 
strongly as it did beforehand. […] The undermining is directed only at the simple deductive reasoning connecting 
these parameters to my answer. So there is a clear sense in which the facts which are not in doubt – the parameters of 
the puzzle – leave no room for anything other than my original answer.” 
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who stole the jewels to be settled – perhaps he still thinks that Lucy is the most plausible suspect, 
but he wouldn’t rely on this claim without re-checking his reasoning after taking a nap. Doing so 
will confirm that he was correct, and he can conclude once again that Lucy stole the jewels. 
  These more detailed descriptions of the examples bring out features of the agents’ attitudes 
that have been hardly attended to in previous discussions (but see Palmira, 2019, for an exception). 
The attitudes that agents hold towards possible answers to a question can play different roles in 
reasoning processes, and an attitude’s role has implications for its typical descriptive and normative 
characteristics. The first role an attitude can play is what we standardly call a conclusion of a 
reasoning process. It can be played by a belief, a credence or a suspension of judgment, depending 
on the agent’s evidence. The initial attitudes that the agents form in our examples before they 
receive the higher-order evidence, and the conclusions they reach after deliberating for a second 
time are plausibly classified as playing this role. But what about the attitudes the agents have after 
they receive the higher-order evidence, but before they get a chance to revisit their reasoning? 
These attitudes play a different role – they are mere placeholders in an ongoing deliberation – and 
they differ with respect to some key descriptive and normative properties from attitudes that 
function as conclusions of reasoning. Distinguishing between the roles attitudes can play in 
reasoning holds the key to solving the problem of misleading higher-order evidence, or so I claim.  
 
3. Transitional and Terminal Attitudes  
3.1 Two Functions for Attitudes in Reasoning 
In two recent papers, I have argued that we can better understand the roles doxastic attitudes play 
in our reasoning if we distinguish between attitudes that function as transitional attitudes and attitudes 
that function as conclusions, or terminal attitudes (Staffel, 2019b, 2020). We can characterize the two 
roles attitudes can play by appealing to differences in their typical descriptive and normative 
properties. The distinction is best introduced by way of an example (adapted from Staffel, 2019b).  
 
Detective Fletcher: 
Manny has committed a murder and tries to frame Fred for it. Detective Fletcher, upon initially 
inspecting the evidence, responds as Manny has planned, and becomes 90% confident that Fred 
committed the murder. However, as she evaluates the evidence more carefully, she discovers 
incongruencies that ultimately lead her to conclude that Fred was framed, so she reduces her 
confidence that Fred is the murderer to 2%. She also comes to believe that Fred didn’t do it.  
 
This is a case in which an agent attempts to settle a question based on a fixed body of first-order 
evidence. The evidence in fact exculpates Fred, but due to Manny’s skillful framing attempt, this 
is not immediately obvious. Fully appreciating what the evidence really supports requires careful 
deliberation, and accordingly Fletcher’s credences shift along with her growing insight into the 
matter.  While she ultimately arrives at the conclusion that is justified by the evidence, her earlier 
credences are significantly different from her final credence that Fred is the killer. These earlier 
credences reflect her view of the case based on how her reasoning has progressed up to then, but 
she does not consider them settled or justified in the same way as the conclusion she reaches when 
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she finishes her deliberation. Yet, even though she thinks that her earlier credences are not her 
considered and final take on her evidence, she doesn’t seem to be epistemically akratic in a way 
that epistemologists often consider problematic. This is because she considers these transitional 
attitudes to be mere placeholders, to be revised as her reasoning leads her to a more thorough 
understanding of her evidence.  
As I explain in Staffel (2019b), transitional attitudes are attitudes that agents hold towards 
the answers to specific questions before they have, by their own lights, finished deliberating about 
how the evidence they currently have bears on these questions. Terminal attitudes are the attitudes 
that epistemologists are standardly concerned with – beliefs, credences or suspensions that are 
adopted as conclusions of reasoning. Sometimes a terminal attitude settles a question, like in the 
Fletcher example, but it doesn’t need to. If an agent’s evidence leaves open various possible answers 
to a question, then a rational agent would adopt non-extreme credences in them as terminal 
attitudes based on their reasoning (and they might subsequently go on to collect more evidence). 
These are terminal attitudes because the agent takes themselves to have finished their examination 
of their evidence. 
  We can think of terminal and transitional attitudes along the lines of different species of 
the same genus – they share some key commonalities that make them the same type of attitude, 
but they are also distinguishable insofar as they play somewhat different roles in our mental lives. 
Both transitional and terminal credences share important features. They are both graded attitudes 
that range from certainty that p to certainty that ~p, they both encode the agent’s confidence in 
different ways the world might be like, and they are both responsive to evidence and deliberation. 
However, they differ in that a terminal attitude is taken by the agent to reflect a sufficiently 
thorough examination of their evidence to answer the question at hand, while a transitional 
attitude is taken by the agent to reflect a merely preliminary take on their evidence. They also differ 
with respect to the norms that govern them. These norms arise out of descriptive differences 
between these attitudes and the different roles they play in our lives. 
  We can identify at least three differences between typical instances of terminal and 
transitional attitudes: The first difference has already been mentioned. It concerns the stability or 
settledness of the attitudes. When we reach a terminal attitude, i.e., an attitude which, by our own 
lights, is adequately supported by our relevant evidence, we don’t typically change this attitude 
unless we learn new information that bears on it or come to think that our reasoning was 
problematic. Transitional attitudes, by contrast, are not settled in the same way. They can fluctuate 
throughout our deliberation even if we haven’t acquired new first-order evidence or spotted a 
potential error. It is in the nature of complex deliberations that our current best estimate of what 
the final answer might look like often changes throughout the process.  
A second descriptive difference concerns the relationship between our attitudes and our 
actions and assertions. Terminal attitudes tend to be readily available as bases for actions and 
assertions. Once we have reached a conclusion regarding how our evidence bears on a question of 
interest, we tend to use this conclusion as a premise in practical reasoning, and we are willing to 
assert it. By contrast, the use of transitional attitudes for assertion and action is typically much more 
circumscribed. If we had asked Detective Fletcher when she first started her investigation who the 
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killer was, she might prefer to say that she hasn’t figured it out yet, or she might say that Fred looks 
like a plausible suspect, but that she has not yet thought about it carefully. It would seem 
inappropriate for her to say that Fred is the likely killer without any qualification, when she herself 
does not consider this to be her settled opinion. A similar observation applies to actions. We usually 
don’t act on transitional attitudes, except in special circumstances. For example, we might act on 
transitional attitudes when doing so has little or no downsides regardless of how the deliberation 
turns out in the end. Fletcher might ensure that Fred does not have a chance to destroy evidence, 
or influence potential witnesses, because these actions could be useful, and are low cost, regardless 
of whether Fred ends up being guilty in the end. Similarly, we might sometimes be forced to act 
on a transitional attitude when we don’t have time to finish deliberating or when we deem a 
reasoning task too difficult to properly complete. We might encounter both of these scenarios when 
taking a difficult test. Yet, in general, we prefer to base our actions on terminal, rather than 
transitional attitudes.  
The last descriptive difference worth mentioning pertains to how we update our beliefs and 
credences when we reason. When we form a terminal attitude, we usually update other attitudes 
that are logically and probabilistically related in light of it, at least insofar as we are rational. This 
is not the case, at least not to the same degree, for transitional attitudes. When our reasoning is still 
in progress, we tend to insulate it to some extent from our remaining web of beliefs. This makes 
good sense from an efficiency point of view: there is no reason to waste energy on full updates of 
our belief network based on attitudes whose status is entirely preliminary.  
These descriptive differences can ultimately be explained by how transitional and terminal 
attitudes represent the world to us. Regardless of whether a credence is transitional or terminal, it 
represents the world to us as having a certain likelihood of being a particular way. When we are 
still in the process of figuring out what our evidence supports, and our credences are still 
transitional, we realize that we have not milked our evidence for all it’s worth. Since we think at 
this time that our representations of the world will be improved by further reasoning, it is 
understandable that we would hold off on using our transitional attitudes as a basis for action, 
assertion, and updating if we can help it. A result that can be interpreted as supporting this 
observation is Good’s theorem about the value of total evidence. Good (1967) shows that our 
decisions have higher expected utility if we incorporate all evidence that is available to us (assuming 
that obtaining and processing the information is cost-free). Hence, on Good’s view, a rational 
agent’s terminal attitudes must reflect all of the agent’s (first-order) evidence, which makes these 
attitudes preferable to transitional attitudes as bases for action from an expected utility standpoint.9 
To be clear, these descriptive differences are intended to characterize paradigmatic cases 
of terminal and transitional attitudes. This does not rule out the existence of edge cases: a carefully 
considered transitional attitude that is formed in the final stages of a reasoning process might 
sometimes be more stable and available for action than a very hastily formed conclusion. Further, 
how reluctant an agent is to rely on a transitional attitude plausibly depends on how close they 
 
9 Thanks to Kevin Dorst for pointing this out to me. 
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think it is to being their final considered opinion, i.e., the conclusion of their reasoning.10 What 
ultimately matters for drawing the distinction is the role the attitude plays in reasoning, and even 
this might sometimes be difficult to determine in particular cases. However, the existence of edge 
cases does not undermine the usefulness of the distinction. Further, my account does not claim that 
agents form transitional attitude every single time they reason. There is no need to form transitional 
attitudes when an agent can arrive at a conclusion quickly and easily. Rather, transitional attitudes 
reflect an agent’s confidence in different possible answers to a question while they are in the midst 
of an extended deliberation. 
 
3.2 Distinguishing Norms for Transitional and Terminal Attitudes 
The fact that terminal and transitional attitudes play different roles in reasoning has implications 
for their normative properties. Plausibly, whether an attitude is fitting or successful from a 
normative point of view depends on whether it properly plays its role, hence, differences in role 
can make a difference to the justification criteria that apply to it. The normative differences 
between transitional and terminal attitudes will hold the key to explaining how agents should 
respond when they receive misleading higher-order evidence.  Theories of epistemic justification 
tend to be designed to apply to terminal attitudes, i.e. attitudes that we adopt once we finish 
reasoning about a subject. Typically, such theories consider attitudes to be unjustified that don’t 
cohere with the agent’s evidence, or ignore part of it, or that are based on superficial reasoning. 
We can see this clearly in the way the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification 
is usually spelled out: What is propositionally justified for an agent depends on what is supported 
by their total evidence. No attitude that is not propositionally justified for an agent can ever be 
doxastically justified for them. Hence doxastic justification also depends on the agent’s total 
evidence, and additionally, on properly responding to this evidence. The reliabilist take on these 
notions, while slightly different (see section 2), shares this feature of evidentialist and hybrid views 
– reliabilist doxastic and propositional justification are designed to apply to the outputs of reliable 
processes or abilities, not to transitional states that may be formed during the operation of these 
processes.  
On this view of how epistemic justification works, only Detective Fletcher’s terminal 
attitude, her low credence that Fred is the murderer, is epistemically justified. None of her 
transitional credences that she forms in the process of reasoning can be doxastically or 
propositionally justified, since they are not supported by her total evidence. However, it seems 
quite inappropriate to call these attitudes unjustified in the same way in which it would be 
unjustified for Fletcher to conclude that Fred is guilty. There is a clear sense in which Fletcher’s 
transitional attitudes track the progress in her reasoning in a way that is rational or justified. We 
can illustrate this by introducing a contrast case in which Fletcher adopts transitional credences 
that seem much less rational. In this version of the case, Fletcher, upon initially inspecting the 
 
10 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for asking me to clarify how transitional and terminal attitudes represent the 
world, and for suggesting that I include the point about different degrees to which agents can be willing to rely on a 
transitional attitude. 
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evidence, realizes that it seems to implicate Fred. (She is still unaware of the incongruencies that 
reveal the framing attempt.) Yet, instead of forming a high transitional credence that Fred did it, 
she infers that Fred is very unlikely to be the killer, forming a transitional credence of 2% that he 
did it. She arrives at this credence by a type of counterinduction, which is an inference strategy on 
which the agent judges what seems best supported by their evidence at that time, and then infers 
the opposite of that. This transitional credence clearly seems far less rational than her high 
transitional credence in the initial version of the case, even though her low transitional credence is 
not her final considered opinion, and even though this credence will actually turn out to be what 
her evidence ultimately supports. Counterinduction is simply a bad strategy for interpreting her 
evidence, regardless of the stage of reasoning she is at. This observation is an instance of a very 
general phenomenon – in early stages of our deliberation, we often adopt credences that are 
informed by our initial take on the evidence, and that are very different from the credences we 
ultimately reach as our conclusions. Not all such credences are equally good or equally rational. 
However, it would not be justified for us to already adopt the credences we end up settling on, 
since doing so would be entirely baseless given how far our reasoning has progressed. 
This suggests that transitional attitudes can be more or less rational or justified, albeit not 
in the same way as terminal attitudes. Their function is not to reflect the agent’s take on the world 
based on a suitably complete assessment of their evidence; rather, their function is to reflect the 
agent’s confidence in different ways the world might be based on the agent’s reasoning up to that 
point. Thus, in order to be rational or justified, a transitional attitude needs to properly capture 
the agent’s take on a particular question at that stage of her reasoning, but this does not require 
that the attitude is based on a reasoning process that is thorough enough to warrant terminating 
the deliberation. However, rational transitional attitudes must plausibly be part of an adequate 
deliberative strategy and reflect the agent’s insight into their evidence at the relevant stage of 
reasoning in order to be at least a good preliminary answer to the question the agent is aiming to 
settle. In earlier work (Staffel, 2021), I offer a schematic definition of what makes a transitional 
attitude rational for an agent:   
 
A transitional attitude d is rationally held by an agent as an answer to some question q at 
some time t 
just in case 
(I) the agent is using a permissible cognitive process to settle the question q, and 
(II) at t, d is suitably attuned to both (a) the evidence the agent has considered up to t, and 
(b) the manner in which the evidence has been considered or processed, and  
(III) d is properly based on the evidence the agent has considered up to t, and (ii) the manner 
in which the evidence has been considered or processed.  
 
This definition is not fully specific, as there can be different ways of filling in the notions of a 
‘permissible cognitive process’, an attitude being ‘suitably attuned’ to evidence and a ‘manner of 
processing,’ and the basing condition in (III). Still, we can see that it vindicates Fletcher’s 
transitional attitudes as rational: her early high confidence that Fred did it is formed as part of an 
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extended, thorough deliberation about her evidence, so condition (I) is met. Condition (II) is also 
met, because early on, Fletcher has reviewed all of her evidence, but only grasps how the pieces 
are connected in a superficial manner. This superficial take on the evidence seems to point towards 
Fred as being the killer, hence, her high confidence that he did it qualifies as being suitably attuned 
to the manner in which the evidence has been processed. Condition (III) is also satisfied, as Fletcher 
properly bases her confidence on her reasoning. The definition also captures why it would be less 
rational for Fletcher to form a low transitional credence that Fred did it upon first inspecting the 
evidence: her low credence is not suitably attuned to the evidence she has considered and her 
understanding of it, because she uses an impermissible cognitive process, i.e., a counterinductive 
reasoning strategy, to arrive at it.  
 It is easy to see how this definition of rationality for transitional attitudes differs from 
standard accounts of justification for terminal attitudes. The main difference lies in condition (II): 
Transitional attitudes can be rational even if they are only based on part of the agent’s evidence, 
and they can also be rational if they are based on a superficial or otherwise incomplete or flawed 
interpretation of the evidence (as long as this interpretation is part of a larger permissible reasoning 
process that allows for mistakes to be corrected). Yet, they still have to be guided by the agent’s 
insight into their evidence at that stage of reasoning in order to give the agent a good preliminary 
idea of what the world is like. Justified terminal attitudes, by contrast, need to be based on a correct 
interpretation of all of the agent’s first-order evidence in order to deliver the most accurate 
representation of the world that is available to the agent at that time (at least if we assume a 
somewhat demanding standard of justification for terminal attitudes).11  
 One might worry at this point that introducing two separate standards of rationality for 
transitional and terminal attitudes is simply too high a price to pay to deal with the problem of 
higher-order evidence. We should not embrace such a proposal unless we have exhausted 
alternative options that rely on a single standard of rationality. I will discuss this objection and 
alternative options after I explain how the current proposal solves the problem of higher-order 
 
11 How exactly the justificatory standards for terminal attitudes should be spelled out depends on how demanding one 
thinks epistemic rationality is. We can generally say that it is rational for an agent to terminate a deliberation and 
adopt the resulting attitude as a conclusion when, by their own lights, their reasoning process has been suitably 
thorough and responsive to their evidence for the purposes at hand. But what does it mean for a reasoning process to 
be suitably thorough and evidence-responsive for the purposes at hand? On stricter, more idealized views of rationality, 
a conclusion of reasoning is rational if the agent reaches it by applying normatively correct reasoning to their total 
relevant evidence.  
Proponents of non-ideal standards of rationality might adopt a more permissive view of what makes terminal 
attitudes rational, allowing, for example, that terminal attitudes can be rational that are arrived at via some suitable 
heuristic. On such a view, certain heuristics will count as permissible cognitive processes according to condition (I) of 
the definition of a rational transitional attitude, and certain conclusions will count as rational that might be judged 
irrational if we applied stricter normative standards. Which heuristics an agent can rationally use is typically thought 
to depend on the specific features of the situation, such as the stakes and the agent’s resources.   
 For the cases discussed in this paper, it doesn’t matter which standards we apply, since both stricter and more 
permissive views of rationality will arguably deliver the same verdicts about our examples. But there will be differences 
between the views’ verdicts if we consider cases in which agents use heuristics in their reasoning to make it more 
efficient, or cases in which the difficulty of a reasoning task exceeds an agent’s cognitive capacities. My arguments for 
the need to apply different standards of rationality to terminal and transitional attitudes apply regardless of the 
strictness of the rational norms we adopt, but I won’t spell them out in further detail here.   
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evidence. I will argue that single-standard views are not satisfactory. To proceed with my 
argument, the claims from this section I need to rely on are (i) that standard views of epistemic 
justification are best construed as applying to terminal attitudes, and (ii) that transitional attitudes 
can also be more or less rational, but not according to the same conditions as terminal attitudes. 
With these claims in hand, I can now put together the unmooring view of how to respond to 
misleading higher-order evidence. 
 
4. The Unmooring View of How to Respond to Misleading Higher-Order Evidence  
We would like an account of what attitude agents should adopt upon receiving misleading higher-
order evidence that lets them respect all of their evidence without being akratic. I propose that we 
can achieve this if we adopt a more fine-grained categorization of the doxastic attitudes that agents 
adopt in the cases under consideration, utilizing the distinction between transitional and terminal 
attitudes. This distinction is independently motivated by thinking about how reasoners move 
through complex deliberations, and we can use it to explain what happens when agents receive 
misleading higher-order evidence.  
 When the agents in our examples first finish their deliberations, they form terminal 
attitudes, i.e. attitudes that they endorse as the conclusions of their deliberation. In Claire’s case, 
this is the belief that the lunch costs $25 per person, and in Sam’s case, it’s a high credence that 
Lucy stole the jewels. According to standard (non-skeptical) views of epistemic justification, their 
attitudes are doxastically justified, because they are supported by their evidence and have been 
arrived at through proper reasoning.12 Next, our agents receive credible but misleading higher-
order evidence that they made a mistake. As other philosophers have argued, receiving information 
of this kind serves as a doxastic defeater. This diagnosis strikes me as very plausible, and it has been 
skillfully defended by various philosophers. For example, in a recent article on the basing relation, 
Ram Neta gives a compelling explanation of why doxastic justification is undermined by credible, 
misleading higher-order evidence. He argues that having a properly based attitude requires the 
agent to represent their exercise of the reasoning disposition by which they have arrived at this 
attitude as being one that provides doxastic justification. Once an agent receives credible evidence 
that their exercise of this disposition might be defective, they can no longer represent their exercise 
of this disposition as providing doxastic justification, and hence one of the necessary conditions for 
holding a properly based attitude is no longer met (see Neta, 2019, for details). Paul Silva (2017) 
also defends this view and offers a variety of possible explanations of why this is the case. My view 
is compatible with different explanations of how exactly misleading higher-order evidence leads to 
doxastic defeat, so readers are invited to supplement whichever explanation they find compelling.13 
 
12 Though see my comment in footnote 5 that some reliabilists might not want to count Sam as justified, and footnote 
11 about alternative standards of justification. 
13 Smithies (2019) also offers an account of why misleading higher-order evidence defeats doxastic justification. 
However, as Titelbaum (2019) rightly observes, Smithies’ account ultimately doesn’t give the higher-order evidence 
enough efficacy to be compelling. Another interesting account of the distinctiveness of higher-order defeat is given by 
DiPaolo (2018), who thinks that higher-order defeaters are state-given rather than object-given reasons. I think his 
arguments are compatible with interpreting these defeaters as doxastic defeaters. 
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As mentioned above, this invites the question of what attitude, if any, agents can be 
doxastically justified in having once they’ve received the misleading higher-order evidence. Silva 
(2017) argues that our agents find themselves in a dilemma, in the sense that there is no attitude 
they can adopt that is doxastically justified. This naturally follows if one accepts the doxastic defeat 
line of reasoning – since the propositional justification is unchanged, there is only one candidate 
for a doxastically justified attitude, and it has been ruled out. Titelbaum (2019) concurs. 
There is a sense in which I agree with this – agents can’t have a doxastically justified terminal 
attitude right upon receiving misleading higher-order evidence. But this does not mean that they 
can’t have a justified transitional attitude. Once an agent receives credible higher-order evidence 
that calls the quality of their reasoning into question, this defeats their doxastic justification, and 
thereby unmoors their rationally held terminal attitude. The agent thus returns to holding transitional 
attitudes towards the various candidate answers to the question at hand. These transitional 
attitudes have the function of providing preliminary, constantly updated representations of the 
world in light of the agent’s evolving understanding of their evidence as they deliberate, and their 
rationality or justification is evaluated according to how well they play this role. This provides a 
way out of the seeming impasse identified by Silva and others, as we no longer have to accept that 
there is no doxastically justified attitude an agent can adopt upon receiving higher-order evidence. 
Since justificatory standards for transitional attitudes differ from those for terminal attitudes, we 
can now identify justified transitional attitudes the agent can adopt without having to endorse 
unattractive modifications to views of justification for terminal attitudes.  
A salient question at this point is whether agents should merely reclassify their attitudes 
from terminal to transitional, or whether they should also drop their transitional confidence in their 
initial conclusions at this point. The key factor in answering this question is in what way the higher-
order evidence calls into question the reasoning that led to the agent’s original answer. Which parts 
of the original reasoning process are deemed defective and in what way determines how far the 
agent is set back in the process of deliberating about the question at hand, and it also determines 
which transitional attitudes are appropriate to adopt in light of this. The agent might either 
downgrade their trust in specific reasoning steps they have executed, or they might dismiss those 
steps altogether, depending on the higher-order evidence they receive.14  
In Sam’s case, it seems reasonable for him to be very worried about having made an error, 
which would lead him to erase or at least downgrade his trust into all the steps of his reasoning that 
he thinks might be affected by his sleep deprivation. This doesn’t need to be all of his reasoning; 
perhaps he remembers ruling out some suspects when he wasn’t so tired from the long investigation 
yet. If he thinks, for instance, that his reasoning was fine up until he was left with two suspects, and 
that his sleep-deprived reasoning was no more reliable than guessing, then he should assign equal 
 
14 Some conciliationists have made efforts to formulate independence principles that make precise how an agent should 
bracket their initial reasoning when arriving at a conciliatory credence upon receiving higher-order evidence. My 
position differs in crucial ways from standard conciliationism, but discussions of independence will likely be very 
relevant for determining what transitional attitudes agents should adopt. For a recent paper on this, see Christensen 
(2019).  
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credence to each suspect being the thief until he can think about what his evidence supports with 
a rested mind.  
We can make similar observations about Claire. Depending on the specifics of the situation, 
she might reasonably be more or less worried that she is the one who made a mistake, which would 
lead her to reduce her confidence in her answer to different degrees.15 In standard presentations 
of the case, Claire and Mallory are said to be equally good at math, and neither of their answers is 
implausible on its face. On this description, it is rational for Claire to give equal confidence to their 
answers, and perhaps to give a small amount of credence to the option that they are both mistaken. 
However, if we vary the parameters of the case, a different credence distribution might be rational. 
For example, if Claire has good reasons to trust her own reasoning more than Mallory’s, or 
Mallory’s answer seems a bit too high or too low to be plausible, she might reduce her confidence 
in her own answer, but not to the point where she gives equal weight to Mallory’s answer. 
Regardless of the exact way we fill in the details here, Claire should consider the credences 
she forms after learning about the disagreement to be merely transitional. She obviously shouldn’t 
consider a 50/50 or 60/40 credence to be a potentially appropriate conclusion of her reasoning – 
after all she knows that it’s a simple math problem with a correct answer. She knows she can arrive 
at a definitive answer if she just spends a bit more time re-doing her calculations. So, just like in 
Sam’s case, her reduced confidence can only be justified as a transitional but not as a terminal 
attitude.  
The claim that the attitudes that are appropriate for Sam and Claire to adopt are 
transitional is not only supported by the fact that they are not appropriate conclusions for their 
respective deliberations in light of their first-order evidence. It is also plausible in light of other 
descriptive features these attitudes exhibit, assuming Sam and Claire behave in ways we tend to 
consider reasonable. I explained in the previous section that transitional attitudes are different from 
terminal attitudes in that their availability as bases for assertion and action is much more limited. 
Sam, upon realizing how sleep-deprived he was, would no longer tell people that Lucy did it, or 
move to arrest her. Rather, he might say that he was suspecting Lucy but had to double-check his 
inferences to be sure, or he might even prefer to just say he was still thinking about it. Similarly, 
Claire (assuming she dropped her confidence) would not assert ‘It’s 50/50 that the bill is $25’, 
rather, she would likely prefer to say she was still checking her math, or that she came up with the 
answer of $25, but that she might be mistaken because her friend had a different result.16  
 
15 The problem of finding a principle that can reconcile one’s higher-order uncertainty about what the rational 
credences are with one’s first order credences has turned out to be difficult to solve. As Dorst (2020) shows, the standard 
reflection principle has counterexamples. He proposes a principle called Trust that constrains which combinations of 
higher-order and first-order credences an agent can rationally adopt. The formal structure of the principle could be 
interpreted as constraining a person’s transitional credences in light of their higher-order uncertainty.  
 Another approach to integrating first- and higher order evidence that could inform what transitional 
credences agents should adopt is the calibrationist view (e.g. Sliwa & Horowitz, 2015), but see Isaacs (2021) for critical 
discussion.  
16 It’s an interesting question what agents should do when they receive (misleading) higher-order evidence that their 
reasoning was flawed, but they no longer care about the right answer (perhaps the restaurant offered to comp Claire 
and Mallory’s lunch, making it irrelevant how much they would each owe). In this case, it is a waste of time to 
redeliberate. One thing we could say is that the agents in these cases are rational to leave in place their transitional 
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More generally, I submit that the unmooring view delivers two attractive payoffs: First, it 
enables a better analysis of what happens when agents receive higher-order evidence, which helps 
us better understand how to divide up the logical space of possible views. Second, it allows us to 
adopt a view of propositional and doxastic terminal justification that preserves the popular idea 
that your beliefs and credences should be supported by your first-order evidence in order to be 
justified, but that avoids the problematic dogmatism of steadfast views. I will explain each of these 
in turn.  
 The first payoff concerns the analysis of cases in which agents receive (misleading) higher-
order evidence. Before the distinction between transitional and terminal attitudes is introduced, 
the question that philosophers were trying to answer was simply “which attitude should people 
adopt when they receive misleading higher-order evidence?” It was expected that a specific rational 
attitude (a specific credence or perhaps a binary attitude like belief, disbelief, or suspension) could 
be identified. However, the epistemological tools and concepts that people were bringing to this 
question were implicitly geared towards (what we can now call) terminal attitudes. While some 
philosophers acknowledged that the agents should keep deliberating (especially Palmira, 2019), the 
significance of this insight for the quest to identify a rational attitude the agent could adopt before 
redeliberating was not appreciated. This created significant tensions in trying to solve the problem, 
since people tried to apply concepts intended for terminal attitudes to a situation in which a rational 
agent could have no such attitude.  
We saw this earlier: Steadfasters claim that justified attitudes must be supported by the 
agent’s first-order evidence. While this seems like a reasonable demand for terminal attitudes, this 
leaves no space for agents to distribute their credences in a more cautious way when they have not 
fully evaluated their evidence yet, or when the quality of their reasoning is called into question. If 
we combine the steadfast demand that justified credences must be supported by the agent’s first-
order evidence with standard views of propositional and doxastic justification, it can easily seem 
like there is no attitude the agent can justifiedly adopt upon receiving misleading higher-order 
evidence, as I explained above. The conciliationist view, by contrast, allows for higher-order 
evidence to interact with first-order evidence in such a way that agents may alter their credences 
upon receiving higher-order evidence. However, this view allows agents to assign significant 
amounts of confidence to claims whose falsity is entailed by the agents’ evidence. The lunch bill 
case is an example of this. This strikes many philosophers as an unacceptable view of justification 
for terminal attitudes, and even conciliationists admit that it is a cost of their view (e.g., Christensen, 
2010). Lacking the distinction between terminal and transitional attitudes, existing versions of 
 
attitudes, since they don’t need terminal attitudes for action or further reasoning. We could also say that they adopt 
“anti-interrogative” attitudes, which is a category recently introduced by Lord (2020). For redeliberation to be a 
rational response to receiving higher-order evidence that one’s initial reasoning was flawed, it is not sufficient that the 
higher-order evidence is credible. The agent must also have a continued interest in answering the question at hand. If 
the question no longer matters to the agent, it is better to leave the matter unsettled and avoid wasting cognitive 
resources. Furthermore, as mentioned in Sam’s case, there is no point in redeliberating if the agent is not in a position 
to improve on their previous reasoning in some way. Sam shouldn’t redeliberate while he is still tired, doing so would 
be a waste of cognitive resources. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to mention this.   
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conciliationism don’t limit their proposed standards of justification to only transitional attitudes, 
for which they are far more plausible than for terminal attitudes.  
Once we introduce the distinction between transitional and terminal attitudes, we gain 
access to conceptual resources that help us see that we don’t need to treat the attitudes agents adopt 
immediately upon receiving higher-order evidence in the exact same way as we treat terminal 
attitudes, or conclusions of reasoning. Further, since this distinction can be developed 
independently by thinking about how complex deliberation works in general, we gain a larger 
context that helps us avoid ad hoc solutions to the problem of misleading higher-order evidence.  
 This leads me to the second payoff of the unmooring view, which concerns how we should 
think of doxastic and propositional justification for terminal attitudes. In earlier work (Staffel, 
2021), I have proposed a schematic account of what makes transitional attitudes rational that is 
responsive to the quality and stage of one’s reasoning, which means that it can incorporate the role 
of higher-order evidence and accommodate conciliationist intuitions. I will not develop this view 
here, but consider how it frees up space for adopting a view of the rationality of terminal attitudes 
that aligns with long-established accounts, such as reliabilism or evidentialism. These views 
emphasize that correct/reliable reasoning from one’s first-order evidence is what really matters for 
justification, but they struggle to find a role for higher-order evidence. The resulting steadfast 
position about how to respond to higher-order evidence thus seems ultimately too dogmatic.  
Yet, with the distinction between transitional and terminal attitudes in hand, we can now 
explain why these traditional, first-order-evidence-based views actually succeed in giving plausible 
standards of justification for terminal attitudes. We can accept that an agent’s first-order evidence 
determines which terminal attitude towards a claim is propositionally justified for them. Further, for 
an agent to have a doxastically justified terminal attitude, it must be properly based on this first-
order evidence (or be reached via a suitable process of reasoning). Given the role we have specified 
for higher-order evidence, which gives the agent information about the quality of their reasoning, 
the view must also make explicit that having a doxastically justified terminal attitude is 
incompatible with the presence of doxastic defeaters.17 If the agent receives credible higher-order 
evidence that calls the quality of their reasoning into question, they can’t have a justified terminal 
attitude until the relevant parts of their reasoning have been checked or replaced. This view retains 
the steadfast intuition that it can’t be rational to arrive at conclusions that are at odds with one’s 
first order evidence, and it avoids the dogmatic implications of the original steadfast view by giving 
higher-order evidence the power of doxastic defeat.  
 This view strikes me as very attractive, since it relies on intuitions about the cases under 
consideration that previously seemed difficult to accommodate by a single theory. I also want to 
emphasize that readers can accept that transitional and terminal attitudes play distinct roles and 
have distinct standards of justification, and that higher-order evidence can be a doxastic defeater, 
while having some freedom about how to fill in these accounts of justification. The basic idea is 
that transitional attitudes are justified when they properly reflect the agent’s insight into what the 
 
17 Depending on one’s epistemological leanings, one might adopt the stronger view that the agent must explicitly rule 
out such defeaters, or the weaker view that the agent doesn’t possess any such defeaters.  
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world is like at intermediate stages of reasoning, which means that they are sensitive to higher-
order evidence and need not be supported by the agent’s total first-order evidence. By contrast, 
terminal attitudes must be justified in light of suitable completed reasoning processes about the 
agent’s first-order evidence, and must not be subject to higher-order defeat. This leaves room for 
adopting, for example, an evidentialist or reliabilist theory of the justification of terminal attitudes, 
and for adopting ideal or non-ideal standards of justification. A proponent of an ideal conception 
of rationality might propose Bayesian norms of rationality as the standards by which we should 
evaluate terminal attitudes. But it’s also possible to adopt standards of non-ideal, or bounded 
rationality as the correct standards of rationality for terminal attitudes. Due to their computational 
limitations, human reasoners cannot fully comply with norms of Bayesian rationality, which has 
led to ongoing debates in philosophy and cognitive science about more computationally feasible 
norms (see, e.g., Dallmann, 2017, Icard 2018, Staffel, 2019a, Staffel, 2021, Vul et al., 2014, 
Weisberg, 2020). Even if we adopt more computationally feasible norms of rationality for terminal 
attitudes, the question of which standards are appropriate for judging transitional attitudes remains 
live. I hope that the question of what the right justification norms for transitional and terminal 
attitudes are will generate a lively debate in future discussions of higher-order evidence and 
deliberation.  
   
5. Alternative Views 
The unmooring view proposes to solve the problem of misleading higher-order evidence by 
appealing to different functional roles played by doxastic attitudes, with different rational norms 
applying to the attitudes depending on their role. However, endorsing separate standards of 
rationality for attitudes depending on whether they play the role of transitional or terminal attitudes 
is a highly revisionary proposal, so it is worth asking whether a view that endorses a single standard 
of rationality for evaluating terminal and transitional attitudes could do the job.18 I will initially 
rely on the Detective Fletcher case from section 3 to examine the viability of a single-standard view, 
and then return to considering higher-order evidence cases. 
In order to evaluate single-standard proposals, it will be useful to explicitly state some 
desiderata that a successful account must meet based on our previous discussion. First, such an 
account should be able to deliver the intuitively correct rationality verdicts about an agent’s 
evolving credences in cases of complex deliberation. It should be able to distinguish between more 
and less rational attitudes to have at different stages of reasoning processes. For example, the 
account should count Detective Fletcher’s initial high credence and concluding low credence that 
Fred is the murderer as rational, as explained above. It should also deliver the verdict that if 
Fletcher adopted alternative credences at any of those stages of reasoning instead, those would be 
less rational. Second, the account should work with our stipulation that the agent’s first-order 
evidence remains the same throughout their deliberation (otherwise, we’d have to completely 
redescribe what happens in these cases, which would be undesirably revisionary in itself). Third, 
 
18 The following discussion draws on suggestion from an anonymous reviewer regarding how a single-standard view 
might work, as well as arguments from Staffel (2021). 
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the view should not count agents as akratic just because they are in the process of reasoning. 
Fletcher’s evolving credences don’t instantiate epistemic akrasia as it is intuitively understood, and 
it is a strike against a view of rationality if it says they do. Fourth, the view should allow us to draw 
a connection between an attitude’s rationality and its appropriateness for its role in reasoning. 
Standards of rationality are related to an attitude’s functional role, hence, we should be able to 
explain why rational terminal and rational transitional attitudes aren’t equally available to play all 
the same roles. For example, we should be able to explain why Fletcher’s rational concluding 
credence would be a suitable basis for asserting that Fred is innocent, but her transitional high 
credence in his guilt would not be a suitable basis for asserting that he is guilty.  
 Any view that judges Fletcher’s earlier and later credences that Fred is the murderer by a 
single standard of rationality needs to appeal to some difference between them in order to be able 
to evaluate both of them as rational. Appealing to changes in the first-order evidence possessed by 
the agent is ruled out by our second desideratum. Hence, any plausible view must appeal to 
changes in the agent’s higher-order evidence and/or their insight into their first-order evidence in 
order to explain why different attitudes are rational for them at different stages of their reasoning. 
This type of view meets the first desideratum. It can explain why Fletcher’s initial high confidence 
and her later low confidence that Fred did it can be rational – her understanding of her first-order 
evidence and her higher-order evidence about the thoroughness of her reasoning clearly differ at 
those two stages of her reasoning.19  
 However, this view has trouble explaining why her earlier attitudes cannot play all the same 
roles as her later ones, and hence runs into trouble with our fourth desideratum. If two attitudes 
are of the same type (credences in this case), and they are rational according to the same standard 
(which they must be according to this view, to satisfy the first desideratum), then they should be 
equally available for reasoning, action, assertion, and whatever other roles they might play.20 But 
only Fletcher’s later credence is an appropriate basis for asserting who the killer is, deciding who 
to arrest, etc. We need an explanation for why this is.  
 An anonymous reviewer suggests that we could appeal to an agent’s second-order attitudes 
for this purpose. On this proposal, what roles a first-order credence can play depends on the agent’s 
second-order credence that their first-order attitude is the correct credence to adopt in light of their 
evidence. The higher the agent’s second-order credence that their first-order credence is their best 
effort to represent the world, the more available the first-order credence is as a basis for action, 
assertion, and further reasoning. On this view, the limited availability of transitional credences for 
playing various roles is explained by the agent’s low confidence that this attitude is their best take 
on their evidence, whereas the more general availability of terminal attitudes for playing various 
 
19 This type of change is also appealed to in my account of what makes transitional attitudes rational at different stages 
of reasoning.  
20 More precisely: if two attitudes are of the same type, and they are rational according to the same standard to the same 
degree, then they should be equally available for playing various functional roles. Two attitudes could both clear the 
threshold for rationality, yet one could clear it by a greater margin, which could make it more available for guiding 
action, assertion, etc. Yet, it doesn’t seem like appealing to a difference in the margin by which Fletcher’s attitudes 
clear the threshold for rationality is going to help the proponent of the single standard view here.  
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roles is explained by the agent’s high confidence that their conclusion is an accurate interpretation 
of their information. 
 This view delivers the correct verdict if we apply it to Fletcher’s concluding low confidence 
that Fred is the murderer. She has a rational high credence that this attitude is the most accurate 
interpretation of her evidence, which explains why she terminates her deliberation and is ready to 
base assertions and actions on her first-order attitude. What about her initial high credence that 
Fred did it, when she hasn’t yet noticed the subtle inconsistencies that point towards the framing 
attempt? Recall that the single-standard view under consideration is designed to meet the first 
constraint. Hence, it counts Fletcher’s initial high credence that Fred did it as a rational response 
to her total evidence at that stage of her deliberation. What should her second-order credence be 
that this first-order attitude is her best take on her evidence? The first option is that her second-
order credence should be high, which makes sense given that the single-standard view counts her 
credence as a correct interpretation of her total evidence at that time. But if her second-order 
credence is high, we can’t explain why her first-order credence is not available as a basis for action, 
assertion, or reasoning in the same way as her concluding low first-order credence. Further, we 
can’t explain why she doesn’t terminate her deliberation. The second option is that her second-
order credence that her first-order credence is her best take on her evidence should be low. This 
seems reasonable considering that she has not finished deliberating by her own lights, and it would 
explain why her first-order credence’s availability as a basis for action and assertion is limited. 
However, now we’re running into a conflict with the third desideratum. This view makes Fletcher 
look akratic: her first-order credence is rational, because it is the correct way of responding to her 
evidence at that point in time. Yet, if she is rational, she should also have a low second-order 
credence that her first-order credence is a correct interpretation of her evidence. This problem 
does not arise for the two-standards view: a transitional attitude can be rational for an agent, and 
the agent can think that it is rational insofar as it represents their best current, non-final take on their 
evidence, while also thinking that the attitude is unlikely to be their best final take on their evidence. 
There is nothing akratic about being in this state of mind, and it makes sense of why the agent is 
unwilling to act on their credences. 21 
 Let’s take stock here: we’ve tried to account for the rationality of transitional and terminal 
attitudes in reasoning by appealing to a single standard of rationality that is responsive to first-
 
21 As an anonymous reviewer points out, whether Fletcher’s attitudes are akratic depends on our understanding of 
akrasia. On a strong formulation of akrasia, “an epistemically akratic agent believes something she believes is 
unsupported by her evidence” (Horowitz, 2014). On a slightly weaker formulation, epistemic akrasia is “a mismatch 
between the doxastic states one is in, on the one hand, and one’s beliefs (or states of confidence) about what doxastic 
state it would be epistemically rational for one to be in” (Lasonen-Aarnio, 2020). If Fletcher is merely uncertain 
whether her 90% confidence is the rational response to her evidence, but doesn’t have high confidence or a belief it is 
not, her attitudes are not akratic on the stronger understanding of akrasia (though they might be on the weaker 
understanding). However, this can’t save the single-standard view, because there are other, similar cases in which it 
can’t avoid attributing akratic attitudes to the agent. In the case of Claire, discussed again below, Claire knows that her 
50% credence that the lunch bill is $25 is not the credence supported by her first-order evidence. She knows that the 
rational credence is either 0 or 1, and that she can figure out which it is. Hence, Claire’s combination of first- and 
second-order credences would clearly count as akratic, even on a strong understanding of akrasia. This means that the 
single-standard view can’t meet all the desiderata in every case of interest. 
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order and higher-order evidence, in combination with an agent’s second-order credences that her 
first-order credences constitute accurate interpretations of her evidence. We now see that this view 
faces a dilemma when applied to transitional credences: On the first horn, the view can’t explain 
why transitional attitudes are less available for playing various roles in reasoning, and why agents 
don’t terminate deliberation upon forming a rational transitional attitude. On the second horn, it 
can’t explain why agents who are in the process of reasoning aren’t epistemically akratic. 
 A proponent of the single-standard view might try to escape this dilemma by pointing out 
that terminal and transitional credences are just different types of credences. But if we go in for this 
proposal, we are now back to a view on which each type of attitude is judged by their own norms, 
since this is the only way to capture all of our desiderata. While it is of course still up for debate 
whether the account I propose in Staffel (2021) is the best way of spelling out these two standards, 
my argument demonstrates that we need some type of two-standard account that functions along 
these lines.22  
 This line of argument shows that a single-standard view can’t meet all of our desiderata 
regarding the nature of transitional and terminal attitudes. It will be instructive to apply this view 
to the lunch bill case to show that it fares no better in the context of solving the problem of higher-
order evidence. In the lunch bill case, we want to say that Claire’s initial high confidence that the 
bill is $25 each is rational, and that once she learns that Mallory disagrees, the rational response is 
to lower her confidence and assign equal credence to the $25 and $27 answers. The single-standard 
view we have been considering can accommodate this, since it says that when Claire gains higher-
order evidence, this changes which credences are rational for her. What should Claire’s second-
order credence be that her 1/2 credence in each of the salient answers is the correct response to 
her evidence? Here, we run into the same issue as above: If we say Claire’s second-order credence 
should be high, because she is in fact correctly responding to her evidence, we can’t explain why 
she should reopen deliberation, and why she doesn’t use those credences for action and assertion. 
Alternatively, we might say that Claire’s second-order credences that her evenly divided first-order 
credences are her best take on her evidence should be zero, because she knows that she has entailing 
evidence for the right answer. But if we say this, then the view seems to say that Claire is (and 
should be) epistemically akratic, which is an undesirable verdict. Further, the view can’t explain 
how Claire can evaluate her evenly divided credences to be more rational than some alternative 
credences, for example ones that give twice as much confidence to Mallory’s answer than to her 
own. Her second-order credence that these unevenly divided credences are correct should also be 
zero, hence, she would evaluate them from her point of view as no better or worse than the evenly 
split credences that are intuitively most rational. This is problematic in light of the first desideratum 
above. As I explained above, the unmooring view that appeals to terminal and transitional attitudes 
with distinct standards of rationality can avoid this dilemma, hence, it fares better than the single-
 
22 In Staffel (2021), I also give a further, though less decisive, argument for introducing distinct standards of justification 
for transitional and terminal attitudes, which has to do with the appeal of preserving an intuitive notion of propositional 
justification.  
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standard view regardless of whether we evaluate it in contexts of complex deliberation or with 
regard to its ability to solve the problem of higher-order evidence.  
 Another proposal for solving the problem of higher-order evidence has been put forth by 
Wedgwood (2019), who appeals to norms of non-ideal rationality to explain what attitudes agents 
should adopt when receiving misleading higher-order evidence.23 Wedgwood endorses a steadfast 
view for ideal rationality, according to which misleading higher-order evidence has no impact on 
what is ideally propositionally and doxastically rational for an agent. However, he thinks that these 
standards are too demanding for normal, non-ideal recipients of misleading higher-order evidence. 
He argues that “in these cases, if you were thinking as rationally as is realistically possible for you 
to do, you would respond to acquiring this higher-order evidence by raising your credence” in 
whichever claim your higher-order evidence misleadingly suggests as being supported. 
Wedgwood’s view initially seems to be a two-standards view, so one might think that it fares better 
than the single-standard view just discussed. However, on closer inspection, this is not the case. 
Wedgwood thinks that the types of cases we’ve been discussing only arise for non-ideal agents, who 
should be judged according to a single standard of non-ideal rationality. This view is thus essentially 
a version of the single-standard view I discussed above, which means that it runs into the same 
dilemma.  
 What about alternative accounts that appeal to distinctive attitudes agents can adopt in 
response to receiving misleading higher-order evidence? These views can also be seen as versions 
of two-standards views, because the distinctive attitudes they postulate come with their own 
rationality norms. One such account is defended by Michele Palmira (2019). Palmira agrees that 
agents who receive misleading higher-order evidence should reopen their deliberation. He argues 
that agents can then suspend judgment until they reach a new conclusion, or they can hold an 
attitude he calls “hypothesis” towards p, if they consider p the most promising answer to the 
question at hand. The solution I defend here is more general than Palmira’s. Palmira doesn’t 
specify whether any particular credences can be rationally adopted by agents upon receiving 
misleading higher-order evidence. Further, my account is motivated by a more general view of 
which attitudes are suitable for agents to adopt during ongoing reasoning processes. However, my 
proposal is compatible with Palmira’s suggestion that agents may adopt a particular hypothesis 
during deliberation.  
 Another alternative attitude view is defended by Fleisher (2021) as a response to the self-
undermining objection to the conciliatory view of higher-order evidence. Fleisher argues that 
conciliationists should accept an attitude towards their view he calls “endorsement”, which is 
distinct from graded and full belief, and which “is the appropriate attitude of committed advocacy 
for researchers to have toward their own theories during inquiry.” Fleisher argues that researchers 
should adopt this attitude towards their theories, and that they may hold on to it even in contexts 
in which they are confronted with certain kinds of challenging evidence. Being specific to research 





suitable for providing a response to the more general problem of misleading higher-order evidence. 
Also, Fleischer’s view doesn’t say which credences agents can adopt in light of receiving such 
evidence. However, my view doesn’t rule out that agents could endorse certain claims in Fleischer’s 
sense. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between transitional attitudes and Palmira’s 
notion of hypothesis as well as Fleisher’s notion of endorsement, see Staffel (2019b).  
 Zach Barnett (2019) and Sanford Goldberg (2013) defend domain-specific views about how 
to respond to disagreement in philosophy. Their views address the question of which attitude 
philosophers can rationally take towards their views in light of widespread peer disagreement. 
Goldberg proposes an attitude called “speculation”, which involves regarding one’s view as 
defensible. Barnett argues for an alternative proposal, according to which one may not believe 
one’s philosophical views, but one may set aside some of the disagreement-based higher-order 
evidence in one’s sincere philosophical theorizing. The unmooring view differs from these views 
insofar as it presents a domain-general picture of how misleading higher-order evidence should 
impact one’s deliberation and belief formation. I don’t want to rule out here that evidence from 
disagreement should sometimes be given special treatment in particular domains of inquiry. 
However, proposals to this effect are not in competition with the unmooring view for giving a more 
general theory of the impact of higher-order evidence.  
 
6. Conclusion 
At this point it should be clear why I label my proposed view the unmooring view of how to respond 
to higher-order evidence. Receiving credible higher-order evidence that indicates that one’s 
reasoning is likely flawed unmoores the previously settled conclusion of one’s reasoning and throws 
the agent back into a transitional stage of their deliberation. This view preserves some of the main 
insights of the existing views, without incurring their costs: The first-order evidence is respected, 
because it determines what attitude is justified as the conclusion of the agent’s reasoning. The 
higher-order evidence is respected, since it serves as a doxastic defeater and it influences which 
transitional attitudes the agent can rationally adopt before they finish their second deliberation 
phase. Also, the agent does not hold akratic attitudes. The unmooring view is fully compatible with 
standard accounts of epistemic justification, as long as we acknowledge that these accounts apply 
to terminal attitudes, and that the justificatory standards for transitional attitudes are different. 
Plausibly, this is how we were supposed to understand standard views of justification all along, so 
this claim merely brings out an implicit assumption of these views.  
 The view also generalizes nicely to related cases. What if an agent receives credible, 
accurate higher-order evidence that their reasoning is flawed? The unmooring view predicts that 
if the agent responds rationally, their attitudes will become transitional and they will reopen their 
deliberation just like in the misleading case. If they can find the error in their reasoning, they can 
now come to hold a doxastically justified terminal attitude, which they didn’t have before. What 
about affirming higher-order evidence, i.e. evidence that indicates that the agent has reasoned 
correctly? In this case, the agent should keep their terminal attitude, and this attitude might even 
become more resilient, i.e. more resistant to possible future doxastic defeaters.  
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 I’ve thus offered a view of how agents should respond to misleading higher-order evidence 
that avoids the pitfalls of the existing main accounts, and that integrates with standard accounts of 
epistemic justification and rationality. The notion of a transitional attitude that the view is built on 
is independently motivated by considerations of how complex deliberations proceed. 
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